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How meaningful is it to talk about the “liberal tradition” as a
context within which constitutional deliberation takes place in
the United States? How helpful is it in considering the role of law
and courts in American political development? Louis Hartz’s
Liberal Tradition in America has reached the half-century mark,
and Hartz’s formulation of the boundary conditions of political
discourse and political life has remained highly influential
despite the many critiques that have been leveled at his thesis
over the years.2 In this essay, I suggest that the answer is that it
is not especially helpful, and that talk of the “liberal tradition”
carries a great deal of baggage constitutional scholars might not
want to carry.
To be sure, there appear to be very real constraints on what
most of those who don black robes and speak the language of con-
stitutional law are prepared to think.
Justice Robert Jackson wrote that
“never in its entire history can the
Supreme Court be said to have for a
single hour been representative of any-
thing except the relatively conservative
forces of its day.”3 The Constitution
establishes boundary conditions for
deliberation that are much tighter, in
the view of some legal scholars and
jurists, than in the view of others, and
arguments abound on how malleable
the principles and values expressed in
that document are. That legal discourse
has been relatively constrained remains
clear. It is also reasonably clear that the 2004 election assured that
the high Court will move closer to the pole about which Justice
Jackson complained than it might have with a different electoral
outcome. Movement in one direction seems to eventuate in some
course correction, when the appointment process operates under a
different regime. But do such observations get us any closer to an
assessment of the value of the concept of a “liberal tradition”? 
When social scientists and legal scholars refer to “the liberal
tradition” in American politics and law, they do not simply mean
something the Democrats used to embrace in the Great Society
era nor do they mean what conservative commentators call “lib-
eralism,” a label attached to any current Congressional
Democratic aspirations. Rather, when scholars talk about “the
liberal tradition” they use it to characterize the conditions and
boundaries within which discussions and disagreements over
principles, meanings, and values take place. In this essay, I will
work with Hartz’s understanding of that “liberal tradition”, since
this understanding of our tradition has been so influential. 
For Hartz, the liberal tradition was characterized by Lockean,
atomistic individualism, wedded to Horatio Alger in the mid-
nineteenth century. He argued that the American democrat, a
peasant-proletarian hybrid, was hoodwinked by the Whig-
Hamiltonian-capitalists in the late antebellum era. Seduced by
the materialist dream of equality of opportunity, the American
democrat accepted the rules of the game as the Whigs them-
selves won the economic race. Hartz contended that the Whigs
had managed to “throw a set of chains around” the American
democrat that became an ideological straightjacket. American
political thought became frozen in time
and intellectually impoverished.4 In
Hartz’s America, politics was marked by
consensus; truths were self-evident,
beyond examination. Conflicts were not
battles to the death, and lines of argu-
ment that moved beyond the boundaries
of a liberal worldview died out fairly
quickly (though heirs of liberalism
could get rather hysterical about chal-
lenges from the left). 
What made all this possible was that
America lacked a feudal past, and there
was no genuine aristocracy against
which an emerging bourgeoisie could
react or against which they could constitute a class identity. It nec-
essarily followed for Hartz, since he accepted the notion that ideas
were the product of relations among social classes, that the peas-
ant-proletariat never developed a working-class consciousness
during the flowering and maturation of the industrial system.
There was a moment for socialist appeals, but Americans missed
the boat and were hereafter immune to such appeals. In the new
world, Locke equaled Burke. That is what Americans conserved,
and became “exceptional” in their immunity to class conflict and
what that produced in Europe. Americans, classed though they
were, thought they were atomistic individuals.
Tocqueville reported that, in antebellum America, “there is
hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”5 This tendency is surely
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more pronounced now. Since struggles over principles, values,
and constitutional meaning frequently take place in American
courts, it is highly appropriate to ask about the place of courts in
“the liberal tradition.”
When we turn to law, some of Hartz’s characterization of the
liberal tradition is useful if not exceedingly original. To give
Hartz his due, perhaps his analysis indeed does help explain why
disparate outcomes based in wealth do not trigger strict scrutiny in
constitutional law, so that, for instance, access to equal educational
resources absent a specific racial bias is not a 14th Amendment
equal protection problem. And perhaps fear of state power, a
legacy of our quarrel with the British empire for Hartz, helps
explain why the American state has few acknowledged affirmative
constitutional obligations.
We also certainly see that the law tends to treat people as indi-
viduals. Discussion of groups or classes of citizens has much
weaker traction. As Antonin Scalia wrote in Adarand, “Individuals
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should
be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to
the Constitution’s focus upon the individuals . . . In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here.”6 Moments during which
group rights or interests are acknowledged seem fleeting.
Hartz recognized (though hardly uniquely) the centrality of
property and possession to the Constitution we framed and the
political struggles we experienced. Property is a core value; its pro-
tection has been ratcheted up during the Rehnquist Court years in
regulatory takings cases. Moreover, the Court’s doctrine of stand-
ing privileges injuries that can be expressed as discrete economic
losses over injuries that are widely shared, more attenuated, or of a
non-economic sort (e.g., some environmental harms). Hartz also
understood that political (likewise legal) discourse is patterned and
that new ideas had to have strong, indigenous roots if they were
going to be able to grow. He concluded that America was extremely
unlikely to become more self-aware or grow new ideas.7
The “liberal tradition,” then, may help explain where law has
not wandered, or where law has kept certain political impulses in
check. However, as Sean Wilentz recently pointed out, “[t]he
great weakness of Hartz’s approach was that, as a unified field
theory of American political thought, it turned politics in a mod-
ern liberal polity into fake battles fought with wooden swords.”8
But The Civil War and bloody industrial struggles in the Gilded
Age have always posed challenges to Hartz’s consensus view. As
we will see, developments during the past third of a century are
also challenging to Hartz’s construct, and give us reason to
reconsider how useful it was beyond its capacity to capture the
particular historical moment in which it was crafted.
The fact that Americans are heirs of Locke is certainly appar-
ent. But our political heritage is also of Hume and the Scottish
Enlightenment, of Machiavelli, of Hobbes, and the Puritans.9
The Constitution is not pure Locke. These other traditions bring
striking potential for tensions.
Several scholars have labored to save Hartz from consensus pol-
itics by positing two or more poles of normal American political
discourse, each reflecting a different perspective on the relationship
between liberal principles. J. David Greenstone offered a more
dynamic picture of American politics than did Hartz, with special
tension between humanist liberal perspectives (basically the
Lockean atomistic individualism of Hartz) and reform liberal per-
spectives (identified with Dewey, Addams, and the progressive
impulse to use the state positively, to ensure that all citizens can
develop their faculties). American political struggles were, then,
quite real; bipolarity best expressed the way in which different
thinkers and groups understood tensions between competing values,
such as between liberty and union in the 1850s. There were, in
Greenstone’s view, nevertheless boundary conditions within which
liberal disagreements took place.
Turning his attention to the Court, Greenstone claimed the
Constitution was a document expressing a complicated but perva-
sively liberal American political culture. The constitution specifies
rules of the game within which clashes take place, legitimating some
modes of conflict and proscribing others, takes some substantive
issues off the table and sets up what realistic expectations are, speci-
fies key actors, institutions and procedures, and establishes certain
philosophical commitments. There were different but patterned ways
in which justices resolved tensions over principles. While humanist,
reform liberal, and republican perspectives could be found in law and
American political culture, Greenstone contends that if a culture is
coherent enough to survive, some of its tenets must be beyond dis-
pute—e.g., liberal theory proscribes certain forms of interpersonal
domination as illicit.10
If a more complex schema for specifying the “liberal tradition”
can make reasoning from the bench more coherent and recognizable,
then it helps make the case for principled decision-making on the
Supreme Court. This is certainly a worthy undertaking since it is one
way to counter the attitudinalist claim that justices are reasonably
sophisticated maximizers of their own policy preferences. Ronald
Kahn, a student of Greenstone, has argued that judicial decision-
making is guided by polity and rights principles, “the basic filters
through which doctrines of popular sovereignty and fundamental
rights confront each other.” Different justices weigh principles of
popular sovereignty and individual rights differently, but all are mem-
bers of an interpretive community in which principle, not instrumen-
tality rules. Kahn contends that principle, precedent, and the legal
culture establish rules of discourse and bounds within which that
discourse takes place. There are disagreements, but they are liberal
(friendly?) ones.11
Alternately, Rogers Smith argues that liberalism is not the only
political tradition in town. He makes the case that we have a
richer (in his view, not better) and wider set of enduring narratives
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to which American political elites appeal, and these include
republican and ascriptive (exclusionary) traditions.12As another
scholar has pointed out, “articulations of citizenship have always
depended upon the exclusion of constructed and ascribed
others.”13 Liberal outcomes may be preferable but they do not
predictably win out in political contests, and are therefore prob-
lematized rather than given as in the Hartzian framework.
There is something lost by attempting to insist that our legal
and political conflicts are preordained liberal. We not only neglect
what is not liberal in American politics but lose the contingency
in new ideas and circumstances. Hartz’s America was defined by
the fact that we don’t experience social revolutions and overthrow
the government; all other change paled by comparison. Instead of
consensus, current scholars are much more likely to see conflict
as the driving force in American political development. This is
true for the Court as well. Political outcomes, while still reflect-
ing our past, are viewed as more contingent and dynamic. Hartz’s
perspective is not helpful in exploring the dynamism of politics or
patterns of institutional development.
There is a good deal that is dated
about Hartz’s “liberal tradition.” Hartz’s
vision suggests that citizens—who have
ostensible interests inherent in their
social class—suffer from that disease of
his era, “false consciousness.” Today,
social scientists and legal scholars seek
to examine ways in which citizens and
groups participate actively in creating political meanings, fre-
quently contesting or resisting dominant values or rules of the
game, even if they turn to ‘weapons of the weak.’ Stated more pos-
itively, institutional actors and activists participate in constructing
constitutional meanings outside the Court. This is a much more
dynamic vision: both values and institutions change. 
The notion of a bounded liberal tradition posits that Americans
(other than extraneous fringe elements) participate in a universe of
shared discourse even if there are different dialects. We understand
each other when we speak—and speak about constitutional
values—but to revisit Stanley Fish’s question, is there a text in this
class?14 If American law strikes a particular balance between the
value of free speech and equal protection, is it the case that those
who see matters differently nonetheless abide by the winner’s rules
and don’t consider themselves permanent losers?15 At a minimum,
this requires some faith that coalitions are shifting and that openness
in the process doesn’t rig the game on behalf of some privileged
discourses or perspectives. Absence of revolt hardly demonstrates
the case for consensus. Mark Tushnet has argued very persuasively
that we cannot assume that people are part of a shared community
of understanding just because they are using the same words.16
Critical legal scholars and critical race scholars point out that law
only looks neutral, objective, and inclusionary from the perspective
of the winners in political and constitutional struggles.
New efforts are afoot to reconceptualize the dynamics of political
change in America as institutions have returned to the foreground in
the study of politics.17 Scholars now posit and investigate conflicts
over rules, norms, and terms of control among different institutions
developing in different measures of political time; instead of an
integrated political system, “relations among political institutions are
(at least) as likely to be in tension as in fit and the tension generated
is an important source of political conflict and change.”18 This
approach allows space for political actors to act creatively by exploit-
ing tensions and contradictions arising from institutional development
patterns. Thus, the political universe “is inherently open, dynamic, and
contested” and “existing norms and collective projects, of varying
degrees of permanence are buffeted against one another as a normal
condition.”19 Institutions and norms pattern American politics and law,
but we are not waking up every morning to repeat Groundhog Day.
Hartz was unable to identify the relationship between cultural and
religious battles and American liberalism,
nor did he offer a good explanation for the
deep divisions that can emerge in
American politics, including divisions
around abortion, immigration, separation
of church and state, and gay marriage.
The “liberal tradition” is not a very good
guide to many current political and legal
struggles.
This is the case in part because religion was not very important
to Hartz’s secular understanding of American political values.20
Survey data find that religion is much more important to
Americans than to those living in other wealthy nations.21 As we
follow legal battles over relations between church and state rang-
ing from school prayer to the teaching of Intelligent Design,
funding faith-based initiatives, and various forms of state aid
flowing toward religious education, it is hard to believe that reli-
gion can be relegated to a mere footnote in American political
development. And when we add in struggles over issues of public
decency and morality, the list of issues engaging religious convic-
tions gets very long indeed.
Cultural and religious conflicts frequently seem to dwarf eco-
nomic issues in American politics. Moral issues loom large when
character formation is taken as central to the political project, as
I have argued the Horatio Alger story was (not the purely mate-
rialist story Hartz took it to be). This Unitarian-inspired formula
can be read to show that the young person’s rite of passage was
vital to the welfare of the community. If the future of the
Republic hinged upon its virtue, then the character of the young
and the character of the Republic were inextricably bound.22
Even with its dream of rising through the ranks, the Alger story
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was entwined in nineteenth century culture wars and meant
something other than Hartz made of it. And this moralistic theme
has continuing resonance in American politics. 
Jim Morone’s Hellfire Nation has recently emphasized the role
that different arguments about sources of sin (systemic versus
personal) have played in American political battles. Contending that
“[l]iberal political history underestimates the roaring moral fervor at
the soul of American politics,” Morone argues that “American politics
developed from revival to revival.” Moral crusaders played a powerful
role in American state-building.23 Jim Block’s Nation ofAgents offers
a very different narrative of American history from Hartz’s, empha-
sizing agency rather than liberty in the
formation of the American self. Central
struggles in American politics pit those
who believe liberty requires that habits of
virtue be inculcated through institutions,
traditions and authority against those who
seek to achieve liberal autonomy without
such imposed constraints. Block main-
tains that “the great theorist of agency
civilization,” for America was Hobbes,
not Locke. Divisions in American politics
can, then, best be understood by examin-
ing tensions between a sectarian
Protestant vision of an exclusive religious
community and understandings of agency as natural and not requir-
ing institutional coercion.24
While pronouncement of a culture war that divides the public
is much overblown,25 there are other, possibly more remarkable,
signs that American politics has been growing increasingly polar-
ized. Surveys documented the deepening political polarization of
the American public.26 In November, 2005, to take just one exam-
ple, 80% of self-identified Republicans approved of President
Bush’s performance in office while only 7% of self-identified
Democrats did.27 Party activists and elected officials are highly
polarized. Congressional voting is more polarized than at any
time in the past century, and when Congress was last this polar-
ized, American politics was more violent and unstable.28 Follow-
up research suggests that a polarized Congress pays less attention
to policies that might narrow income disparities and less attention
to social welfare policy for all but the elderly than a less polarized
Congress.29 Since other evidence suggests that when Americans
benefit from governmental social provision policies, they are
more likely to be invested in and participate in political and civic
life, policy disinvestments in all but the elderly that we have seen
since 1980 may also be linked to a decline in civic engagement.30
According to students of Congressional roll-call voting, propen-
sity for legislative gridlock appears to rise with party polarization
in Congress, and reduces the output of significant (as opposed to
trivial and narrow) legislation. “Perhaps one of the most important
long-term consequences of the decline in legislative capacity
caused by polarization is that Congress’s power will decline relative
to the other branches of government.”31 It even seems plausible that
perceptions of Supreme Court activism may be rising as Congress
is doing less and even delegating enforcement power to courts, and
that such perceptions may therefore be integrally linked to what is
going on elsewhere in the federal government. This is a question
that students of courts might well consider.
Periods of increasing Congressional polarization seem to track
increases in economic inequality and rises in immigration restriction
sentiment for most of the twentieth century.32 Evidence that economic
gains of the last several decades have
gone disproportionately to those in the
top tier in income distribution is every-
where to be found, including in official
government data. A new study indicates
that major pillars of economic security
for Americans—including job stability
and public and private benefits that
workers have expected to access (health
care, retirement benefits)—are eroding
dangerously.33 Even if there is an
increase in overall economic prosperity,
there is not a sense that rewards are
shared, that we are all of one estate, or
sense of vindication for the American dream.
Does the Constitution settle or remove from the table the
deeply divisive issues in contemporary American politics, or do
at least some of these become subject of constitutional contro-
versy? We certainly know that some do. If some do, why these
and not others? Is it possible that some of these grievances can
find no language—partly because of the way earlier Courts have
set precedents—through which the struggle could capture the
attention of federal courts? The “liberal tradition” does not seem
to offer a good answer to how the Court engages or disengages
from deeply divisive issues. Do justices who have different
understandings of polity and rights principles and of what to do
when principles clash manage to pick their way through the
minefields and “settle” or dispose of these questions in a way
that keeps conflict within manageable bounds? Is it the Court,
then, that serves as border guard, defining the boundaries of
some “liberal tradition”? Scholars could, indeed, ask such ques-
tions, but they cannot presume the answers by invoking the
“liberal tradition”. 
What do students of law and courts gain by invoking “the
liberal tradition”, when we also have to realize that it saddles
inquiry with a good deal of baggage? Hartz wrote at the end of
the McCarthy era and during the Cold War. At the time of The
Liberal Tradition in America, there were few extreme liberals or
conservatives in Congress. 
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Bipartisan support helped pass race legislation and some social
welfare legislation. Parties were perceived as chasing the median
voter, offering few substantial choices to the public. There was
even a claim that we had witnessed the end of ideology.
John Gerring, who has studied party ideologies in the United
States, refers to this period as the “universalist epoch.” Party rhetoric
was inclusionary beginning in the 1940s and 50s. By the time of
Stevenson’s campaigns, Democrats had stopped attacking their
opponents and had stopped distinguishing themselves as “liberals”.
In fact, even shortly after Roosevelt’s first election, when “liberal-
ism” was used in Democratic campaigns, it was usually used as part
of the trilogy including communism and socialism, thus being
invoked as an American, rather than a partisan philosophy.34 Gerring
argues that a universalist postwar Democratic party delivered a mes-
sage with “intertwined concepts of consensus, tolerance, compro-
mise, pragmatism, and mutual understanding.”35 This sounds highly
consistent with Hartz’s liberal tradition. And during the Cold War, the
meaning of America was defined against the Soviet Union and
liberalism was held up as the antedote to the appeal of other “isms”. 
Political and legal scholars who are wedded to the “liberal
tradition” are, I would suggest, captivated by a description of a
political world that best encapsulated a particular historical
moment. Even though law and politics are historically informed
and patterned discourses, there is not a great deal to be gained—
and actually a good deal of understanding to be lost—by latching
on to Hartz in 2006.
Political battles in the United States are likely to be expressed in
appeals to time-honored traditions and values, and often are
expressed in constitutional language. We do tend to constitutionalize
our political struggles, perhaps an indication of the extent to which
the Court has become part of our strategic calculus in politics. The
Constitution becomes a weapon to fight with, and it means different
things to different contestants. If we look to American history, we
will find plenty of struggles over constitutional meaning.36 The out-
comes of these struggles tell us quite a bit about power, mobilization,
political opportunities, and institutional change. We often learn about
contingency and possibility rather than inevitability. I do not think we
learn very much about these struggles—or even see most of them—
by positing a bounded “liberal tradition” in American political or
legal discourse. And it may be that by thinking in terms of boundaries
and constantly repeated tropes, we also miss opportunities to remain
open to new possibilities. 
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